While studying for the FE Exam, I recently dusted off a subject that I learned a decade ago as a college senior: engineering economics. It didn’t fully make sense at the time, a compendium of formulas that manipulate capital and operating costs with annualized cash flow estimates, interest rates, inflation adjustments, depreciation from planned obsolescence, and more. I understand the rationale behind teaching this to engineering students, as these analysis tools would be useful when engineers are elevated to project management roles that deal directly with financial resources. However, in my experience, the business-savvy decision-makers often do not understand these financial metrics, instead embracing a less mathematical, all-or-nothing mode of thinking. The disconnect between engineering economics and business practice was striking to me, in a way explaining some of the current volatility experienced within the economy.
To establish a basis, I’ll start by summarizing the “engineering school edition” of project economics, which mirrors financial tools used by other fields. We learn accounting principles, including how to create a balance sheet and apply terms like book value, gross margin, ROI ratio, leverage, liquidity and solvency. We learn several ways to calculate asset depreciation (most notably MACRS) to justify equipment purchases considering tax implications. We learn how to weigh benefits and costs in many different scenarios, quantifying societal benefits (in dollars) for municipal projects and projecting cash flows for industrial investments. Sensitivity analysis – including risk assessment, which is a key aspect of engineering design – adds rigor to these cost-benefit evaluations. As a preliminary design step, we learn to use discount factors to assess the profitability of a project against a nominal interest rate from investing in a bond or long-term index fund, for example, adjusting for inflation and manipulating the bases of capital and operating costs to fit the conventional yearly terms. Many of the discount factor calculations over a wide range of cash flows and interest compounding strategies are tabulated in the document below; incidentally, it is an excerpt of the reference handbook for the FE Exam, and I find it a comprehensive yet succinct resource for these value-fudging formulas.
In industry, at least in my experience with small-to-medium-sized companies, all of these formulas go out the window. I’ve sat in many meetings with owners and investors, featuring rolling leather chairs and unbuttoned blazers and ego-stroking small talk and, if we’re lucky, perhaps a few PowerPoint slides. These guys invariably want to skip straight to the bottom line: what is my money doing for me? Investors are not impressed by uniform theoretical cash flows or future worth regressions; rather, they want to know the minimum amount of money they can put in for an acceptable return. As the engineer overseeing technical aspects of the project, I would be responsible for coming up with an itemized list of expected capital and labor costs (treated as upfront expenditures, never annualized) and an implementation timeline. Exact figures were generally expected, necessitating detailed equipment quotes instead of cost index estimates or other shorthands. The finance team, led by investors or owners, would generate their own revenue projections based on idealized profit margin and market share estimates. The resulting negotiation between finance and engineering was usually one-sided, as they would try to make line-by-line cuts, especially to labor, in the hopes of saving as much money as possible while keeping their glistening business projections intact.
One might argue that this is the normal give-and-take of business, but it often led to what I would consider ill-informed and dangerous decision-making. The financial pressure to make cuts to critical safety infrastructure and ignore expensive code requirements was strong and ever-present. When implementing a design for a hand sanitizer blending process, I had to fight hard to get critical safety features like automated fill/level control for the stainless steel blend tanks and a fire alarm-sprinkler system for the building. I was forced to sacrifice other requisite items like FDA-compliant ancillary equipment for material handling, EPA-compliant pollutant testing equipment, and IFC-compliant safety ventilation. The owners had made the calculation that saving several hundred thousand dollars up front was worth the possibility of a fine, as any regulatory enforcement would take months or years to take effect and the amount of penalty is generally limited by law (e.g. USDOT can assess a maximum fine of $250,000 for a shipping violation, TCEQ can assess no more than $25,000/day, etc.). They would sooner stop production or disband the company in the event of a regulatory crackdown, as long as they have made it to the bank first – an attitude that I encountered with a more extreme twist in 2020 when numerous lawsuits and unpaid wage claims never caught up with the people behind a fly-by-night manufacturing operation in rural west Texas.
When investors see their peers garner massive returns in startup companies with often-nefarious business practices, they want massive returns for themselves. One investment group declined to invest in a Felix Tech project because they “will not invest in anything that doesn’t guarantee at least a 500% return within 5 years.” We didn’t even qualify for a meeting with another group, which required that investment candidates already have an operating revenue of at least $2 million at a margin of at least 30% (i.e. an established, highly profitable business…and these guys had the audacity to call themselves ‘angel’ investors). When this expectation of high returns is coupled with an aversion to risk, the pressure to make unrealistic promises is immense. Wishful thinking prevails, making the interest rate formulas for comparing returns with the bond market seem droll and irrelevant. But there is a sobering reality that every project is at risk of losing its funding to another profitable venture, an extraordinarily difficult challenge in the increasingly financialized climate of the last five years where massive gains in the stock market, cryptocurrency, and real estate assets were commonplace. When a financier decides to pull $500,000 out of a $2 million build to invest in cryptocurrency instead, it has a debilitating effect on the project and sends shockwaves that impact everyone connected to the business.
The broader point here is that when I watch the recent bank runs at Silicon Valley Bank, First Republic Bank, and others, the overall behavior feels familiar. Greedy investments were made into tech companies that were pressured into promising the moon. The banks entrusted with safeguarding these investments also got in on the action, seeking to maximize returns for their own shareholders. When the first dominoes fell, the parties with the riskiest positions had to race to pull their money from these banks. Meanwhile, the banks have a backstop from the federal government, who has committed to reimbursing account holders up to $250,000 or likely more through the FDIC. The American people will pay for this two-fold, as taxpayer money is used to subsidize financial impropriety and as the larger economy suffers from the speculative instability of major banks collapsing. Maybe the business attitude will undergo a much-needed adjustment as time goes on – especially as the explosive growth of financialized assets cools and investors must consider investing again in longer-term projects that generate solid, lasting returns. Or maybe the financial system needs to borrow from engineering logic, appropriately assessing its risks and recalibrating toward a realistic rate of stable growth for the future.